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AllI. Introduction
This paper evaluates the impact of a large-scale social experiment ðthe
Aligning Learning Incentives, or ALI, programÞ designed to promote
mathematics achievement through performance-based monetary in-
centives. Eighty-eight Mexican federal high schools with over 40,000
students were randomly allocated to three treatment groups and a con-
trol group. Treatment 1 ðT1Þ provides individual incentives to students
only and treatment 2 ðT2Þ to teachers only. Treatment 3 ðT3Þ offers both
individual and group incentives to students, teachers, and school ad-
ministrators, thus rewarding cooperation among all the educational ac-
tors in the school. The ALI program began in the 2008–9 academic year
and ran for 3 years, ending in the 2010–11 academic year. Incentives
were determined by student performance on curriculum-based mathe-
matics tests administered to students in grades 10–12 at the end of each
year.
An important rationale for utilizing monetary incentives rather than
intervening in the educational process directly is that policymakers arenot
likely to know the best means of improving education given the hetero-
geneous attributes of students, teachers, and administrators across schools.
The production process by which school, student, and family inputs are
transformed into educational outcomes is not well understood.1 Providing
monetary incentives tied to student performance allows students, teachers,
and principals to choose the best means to improve performance given
their circumstances. The ALI program was designed to evaluate the effi-
cacy of alternative performance-based incentive schemes.
Research on the impact and efficacy of performance-based monetary
incentives in education is relatively sparse. We review some examples
from the literature of studies of teacher and student incentives in the
next section, restricting attention to randomized control trials in which
themeasured outcomes are test scores, as in theALI program. As far as we
know, the ALI program is the first randomized control trial to incorpo-
rate incentive payments to both students and teachers.2 Previous stud-
ies implement performance incentives for students or teachers only.1 See, e.g., Hanushek ð1986, 2003Þ, Hedges, Laine, and Greenwald ð1994Þ, and Krueger
ð2003Þ for differing views about the interpretation of findings from the education pro-
duction function literature. Todd and Wolpin ð2003Þ discuss the methodological under-
pinnings of that literature.
2 There was a recent nonexperimental program in Dallas, Texas, that paid both students
and teachers for passing grades on advanced-placement exams ð Jackson 2010Þ.
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aligning learning incentives of students and teachers 327A comparison of the ALI program impact estimates to those of prior
studies reveals that the treatment effects associated with the ALI treat-
ments in which students receive incentives are quite large, especially for
the treatment in which both students and teachers receive incentives.
However, close examination of the test book answer patterns shows that
part of the reason for higher test scores in the treatment group is a
higher rate of cheating, in the form of student copying, than in the
control group, particularly in higher grades and in later years of the
program.3 Our impact analysis therefore provides two sets of estimates of
treatment effects: one that does not account for copying and one that
adjusts the test scores of students identified to have been likely to have
copied a part of their test answers, as determined through a comparison
of multiple-choice answers of pairs of students and a statistical model for
the probability of having matching answers. Even with a liberal criterion
for identifying copiers and with two different ways of adjusting their
scores, we find substantial program effects on student test scores, indi-
cating that the performance incentive program significantly affected
mathematics achievement.
To highlight the magnitudes of the treatment effects, consider the
copying-adjusted treatment effect estimates for the 2008–9 entering tenth-
grade class. The average treatment effects for the first year they were in
the program, as tenth graders, were 0.17 of a standard deviation for
treatment group T1, 0.01 of a standard deviation for T2, and 0.31 for T3.
In the second year of the program, as eleventh graders, the treatment
effects were 0.30 for T1, 0.02 for T2, and 0.44 for T3. Finally, when this
cohort reached the twelfth grade, treatment effects were 0.23, 0.04, and
0.57. Treatment effects were statistically significant at conventional levels
in all three years for T1 and T3 but in none of the years for T2. The
pattern of positive effects for T1, even larger effects for T3, and no effect
for T2 ðwith one exceptionÞ was also found for all the other tenth-grade
entry cohorts during the years they were in the program.
A potentially important caveat to our findings is that we cannot ensure
that the control students ðand to a lesser extent the T2 studentsÞ, for
whom the ALI test is low or no stakes, applied the same level of test-
taking effort as the T1 and T3 students. We develop two sets of lower
bounds based on alternative assumptions that take into account the pos-
sibility of differential effort between the treatment and the control stu-
dents. In the more conservative and, in our view, less plausible case, in
which the entire differential between T1 and control students is attributed
to differential test-taking effort in all years, the T3 effects ðadjusted for
copyingÞ in year 3 were 0.31, 0.17, and 0.34 for the three grades. In the
second case, where only the year 1 differential between T1 and control3 We do not find evidence of teacher cheating.
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Allstudents is attributed to test-taking effort, the year 3 effects in the three
grades are 0.15, 0.12, and 0.13 for T1 and 0.47, 0.29, and 0.47 for T3.
James Heckman has a number of papers illustrating both the value and
the limitations of randomized social experiments for policy evaluation
purposes ðsee, e.g., Heckman and Smith 1995; Heckman 2000; Heckman
and Urzua 2010Þ. As he shows, randomization provides information only
on mean treatment effects for a particular program design without ad-
ditional assumptions. A central theme of Heckman’s research is that eco-
nomic models can be used to understand the mechanisms through which
a program operates and to investigate effects of program designs that
differ in some ways from the program that was implemented. To this end,
in Section IV, we develop an economic model that can rationalize the
results from the ALI experiment.
In the next section, we discuss relevant literature. In Section III, we
provide details of the ALI experiment, including the overall design, the
selection of the sample, a description of the tests, and the incentive
schedules. In Section IV, we present the results of the experiment and
briefly outline a model to interpret the results. Section V presents con-
clusions.II. Related Literature
As noted, previous experimental studies of performance incentives pro-
vide incentives only to teachers or to students.
Teacher incentives.—Muralidharan and Sundararaman ð2011Þ evaluate
the effects of teacher performance incentives and school input inter-
ventions in rural India. They randomly allocated schools to four treat-
ment groups and to a control group, with 100 schools in each group.
One of the treatments was a performance incentive paid to teachers on
the basis of the average improvement in their students’ test scores. Tests
were administered in mathematics and language at the beginning and
end of the school year. The impact of the performance incentive pro-
gram was a 0.28 ð0.17Þ standard deviation increase in the average test
score in mathematics ðlanguageÞ.
Glewwe, Ilias, and Kremer ð2010Þ conducted a randomized trial over
a 2-year period that provided primary school ðgrades 4–8Þ teachers in
50 rural Kenyan schools incentives based on student performance on
district-level exams in seven subjects. Students in treatment schools had
higher test scores ðaveraged over all subjectsÞ in the second year of about
0.14 of a standard deviation ð0.07 standard error ½SEÞ, but the gains
dissipated in the third year after the program ended.
Springer et al. ð2010Þ report on a recent 3-year teacher-incentive ex-
periment in Nashville, Tennessee, public schools. Middle school math-
ematics teachers, who volunteered for the program, were randomly as-This content downloaded from 128.042.187.224 on May 25, 2017 12:58:04 PM
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group could earn bonuses, depending on the standardized test scores
achieved by their students, of $5,000, $10,000, or $15,000. The magni-
tudes of the treatment effect estimates in mathematics in grades 6–
8 were 0.06 standard deviations or less and were not statistically signifi-
cant at conventional levels. In grade 5, the average treatment effect was
0.06 of a standard deviation ð0.04 SEÞ in year 1, 0.18 ð0.06 SEÞ in year 2,
and 0.20 ð0.08 SEÞ in year 3.
Student incentives.—Angrist and Lavy ð2009Þ study the effects of a stu-
dent cash incentive program in Israel that offered high school students
incentives for progressing from tenth to eleventh grade, for progressing
from eleventh to twelfth grade, and for passing the Bagrut exam.4 Forty
high schools were randomized in or out of the program. The school-
based program increased Bagrut passing rates by 6–8 percentage points.
Kremer, Miguel, and Thornton ð2009Þ evaluate the impact of a merit
scholarship program for sixth-grade girls in Kenya. Schools were ran-
domized to treatment and control groups, and scholarships were awarded
to the top 15 percent of sixth-grade girls in treatment schools on the basis
of standardized achievement test scores. On average, girls in participating
schools raised their achievement by 0.2 standard deviations. They also
estimate impacts by quartile of achievement and find the largest impacts
in the second quartile, a group that would seem to have relatively low
probabilities of winning an award. The conclusion that learning improved
even for those unlikely to win an award is tempered, however, by the
finding that the lowest impact is for the lowest quartile.
Fryer ð2010Þ reports results from four different field experiments that
implemented various student incentive programs, in Chicago, Dallas, New
York City, and Washington, DC ðin predominantly low-performing urban
public schoolsÞ, with substantial heterogeneity in terms of grade levels
participating and incentive design. In New York City, payments were given
to fourth- and seventh-grade students conditional on their performance
on 10 standardized tests. The program did not yield positive impacts on
final-year test scores. In Chicago, incentives were paid to ninth graders
every 5 weeks for grades in five courses. The program led to higher grades
but had no detectable effect on test scores. The Dallas program gave
second graders $2 per book read, with an additional requirement of
passing a short quiz on the book, which led to significantly better reading
test scores and also to higher grades. Finally, in Washington, incentives
were given to sixth, seventh, and eighth graders on a composite index
intended to capture their school attendance, behavior, and measures of
inputs in educational production. The impact estimates are suggestive of4 The Bagrut exam is a prerequisite for admission to university and for certain types of
jobs.
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Allsubstantial positive impacts but are not statistically significant. Fryer
ð2010Þ concludes from these results that children in these schools do not
know what behaviors would lead to improved test score performance and
are thus better served by incentives tied to inputs rather than to outcomes.
Levitt, List, and Sadoff ð2010Þ implement a field experiment to eval-
uate the effects of a program that gave monthly financial incentives to
ninth-grade students or their parents in two high schools in a suburb of
Chicago. The incentives were given for meeting an achievement stan-
dard that is a composite of multiple measures of performance, including
school attendance, behavior, grades, and test scores. The experimental
design varied the award recipient ðstudents or parentsÞ and whether
the incentive was awarded as a piece rate or as a lottery. The incentive
amounts had an expected value of $50 per month, for a total of $400 per
year. The four treatments were randomized at the student level. The
study finds modest overall effects of the incentives on achieving the com-
posite achievement standard—a 15–22 percent increase—but that the
effect is not statistically significantly different across treatment types.
The study does not find effects of the treatments on standardized test
scores. Barrow and Rouse ð2013Þ evaluate the effect of two performance-
based scholarship programs: one for students in their last year of high
school and one for postsecondary students. Incentives varied in length
and magnitude. The paper finds that students eligible for incentive pay-
ments devoted more time to educational activities and less time to work
and leisure activities.
It is difficult to generalize from these studies ðor from a larger set that
includes additional nonexperimental studiesÞ. First, there are not many
evaluation studies of performance-based incentive programs. Second,
the existing studies differ in their designs and in the populations stud-
ied. And, third, in contrast to the ALI program, the agent receiving the
incentive is not varied within the same population.5 However, the litera-
ture generally finds small measured effects of performance-based incen-
tive programs, regardless of whether the student or teacher receives the
incentive; an average treatment effect above 0.3 standard deviations in
test scores appears to be unusual.III. The ALI Experiment
The ALI experiment began with the 2008–9 academic year and ended
with the 2010–11 academic year. There were a total of 88 high schools in
the experiment, consisting of three groups of 20 treatment schools, each5 Levitt et al.’s ð2010Þ study is an exception, as noted, in which there is randomized
variation in whether the student or his or her parents received the incentive payment.
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aligning learning incentives of students and teachers 331subject to a different incentive design, and a fourth group of 28 control
schools with no incentives. In the first program year, there were approx-
imately 12,000 students per treatment and 16,800 students in the control
schools. All students in each high school, grades 10–12, participated in
the program in each of the three years.
Incentive payments were based on standardized curriculum-based
mathematics examinations in grades 10, 11, and 12 given at the end of
each academic year. Specifically, the four groups were as follows:
1. Treatment group 1 ðT1Þ: Payments to students were based on their
own performance.
2. Treatment group 2 ðT2Þ: Payments to mathematics teachers were
based on the performance of the students in their classes.
3. Treatment group 3 ðT3Þ: Payments to students were based on their
own performance and on the performance of the other students
in their class. Payments to mathematics teachers were based on the
performance of the students in their classes and on the perfor-
mance of the students in all other mathematics classes. Payments
to nonmathematics teachers and school administrators were based
on the performance of all the students in the school.
4. Control group ðCÞ: There were no payments.
A. Sample Selection and Characteristics
There are 706 federal upper-secondary schools in Mexico.6 From that
set, we identified 357 schools that were not in their first year of operation
and had only one session per day, in the morning.7 There are four types
of federal upper-secondary schools in Mexico: academically oriented
schools, technically oriented schools with a marine focus, technically
oriented schools with an agricultural focus, and technically oriented
schools with an industrial focus. The technical orientation of the latter
three school types has diminished over time, and all the schools are now
considered college preparatory. Of the 357 “morning-only” schools, 146 Upper-secondary schools ðhigh schoolsÞ in Mexico encompass grades 10–12 and lower-
secondary schools grades 7–9.
7 The selection of schools was based on data supplied by theMinistry of Education. There
were seven schools in their first year of operation, four schools for which the number of
sessions could not be determined, and 262 schools with multiple sessions. We dropped
multiple-session schools because each session essentially constitutes an autonomous school,
having a separate principal ðwhen this is accounted for, the number of schools is thus about
1,000Þ. Clearly, it would have been problematic to have only one session in a given multi-
session school as part of the program or to have different sessions with different treatments.
Moreover, given the likely similarities in the student bodies and some overlap in teachers,
having both sessions within the same treatment group would reduce the effective number of
schools.
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Allfall into the first category, 26 into the second, 183 into the third, and 134
into the fourth. Academically oriented schools have a different mathe-
matics curriculum and so were not included in the ALI program. The
schools with a marine specialization also were not included because,
after further selection criteria described below, there were too few to
randomize across the treatment and control groups.
In addition to federally administered upper-secondary schools, there
are also state-administered schools that are publicly funded and private
schools.8 Students successfully completing lower-secondary school ðninth
gradeÞ may apply to any of these schools. Admissions to public ðfederal
and stateÞ and private schools are determined on a competitive basis. To
minimize the impact of the ALI program on students’ application deci-
sions, and thus on the composition of entering students in years 2 and 3
of the program across the treatment and control groups, schools that
were located within 10 miles of another federal upper-secondary school
were eliminated.9 Very small schools ðfewer than 200 studentsÞ and very
large schools ðover 2,000Þ were also eliminated, as were schools that had
satellite divisions. Finally, schools located in the states of Oaxaca and
Michoacan were eliminated because of feasibility constraints. With these
restrictions, 135 schools remained out of which 88 were chosen for the
experiment.
Randomization was performed using a school-based block randomi-
zation design. Schools were first grouped into nine blocks, where the
block definitions were based on school size and the previous year’s
graduation rate.10 Within each block, schools were allocated at random to
treatment regimes.11 The block definitions ðcutoffs on school size and
graduation ratesÞ were chosen to have roughly similar numbers of schools
within each block.8 In 2008, about 25 percent of upper-secondary school students attended federal public
schools, 42 percent attended state public schools, and 33 percent attended private and
other schools.
9 Most of the schools are located in rural areas because of the distance criterion. We do
not know if there are state schools, autonomous schools, or private schools located closer
than 10 miles to the ALI schools.
10 Blocking is a widely used method for improving the precision of estimated treatment
effects by increasing the comparability of the variables used to define the blocks across
treatment/control groups. As described in Cox andReid ð2000Þ, the rationale for blocking is
to improve precision by using prior knowledge on which baseline characteristics of the units
being randomized are likely to be associated with the treatment responses. For maximal ef-
ficiency, units should be grouped into blocks so that all units within a block might be ex-
pected to give similar responses in the absence of treatment differences.
11 Following the recommended procedure of Cox and Reid ð2000Þ, we randomized six
times and chose the randomization in which the groups ðT1, T2, T3, and CÞ are most com-
parable in terms of baseline observed characteristics. Cox and Reid discuss that if there is
any imbalance in observed characteristics that may be related to treatment response, it is
better to rerandomize to achieve a better balance in the covariates than to do ex post re-
gression adjustment to adjust for imbalance, which would entail a loss in degrees of freedom.
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aligning learning incentives of students and teachers 333Tables 1 and 2 present evidence on the quality of the randomization
among the 88 schools. Table 1 compares the treatment and control
schools and the federal schools not in the experiment on aggregate
school-level data supplied by the Ministry of Education. The first two var-
iables, the student population and the graduation rate, as noted, were
used for blocking. The other variables in the table were used as additional
evidenceonthequalityof the randomization.They included the following
baseline characteristics: percentage of Oportunidades recipients within
the school, mean class size, percentages of teachers with university de-
grees, percentages of newprincipals,meandistance to the nearest federal
upper-secondary school, school type distribution ðDGETI or DGETAÞ,TABLE 1
Comparison of Treatment, Control, and Other Federal Non-ALI Schools:
2007–8 Academic Year
C T1 T2 T3 Non-ALI
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ ð5Þ ð6Þ
Number of schools 28 20 20 20 269 408
Blocking variables:
Mean number of students 582 632 609 550 656 691
ð.77Þ ð.55Þ ð.72Þ ð.63Þ ð.12Þ ð.02Þ
Mean graduation rate ð%Þ 58.3 60.4 56.2 57.9 55.3 54.2
ð.74Þ ð.53Þ ð.61Þ ð.94Þ ð.24Þ ð.15Þ
Nonblocking variables:
Oportunidades ð%Þ 40.3 39.5 40.6 40.1 37.6 18.9
ð.99Þ ð.90Þ ð.97Þ ð.97Þ ð.42Þ ð.00Þ
Mean class size 35.8 41.0 39.0 35.7 34.7 42.1
ð.42Þ ð.15Þ ð.41Þ ð.97Þ ð.56Þ ð.00Þ
Teachers with university
degree ð%Þ 82.3 79.4 81.7 84.8 81.5 81.0
ð.99Þ ð.46Þ ð.87Þ ð.94Þ ð.74Þ ð.60Þ
New directors ð%Þ 25.0 25.0 30.0 40.0 29.4 25.2
ð.72Þ ð1.00Þ ð.71Þ ð.29Þ ð.62Þ ð.98Þ
Mean distance to nearest federal
upper-secondary school ðkmÞ 32.9 32.8 31.4 32.4 23.9 15.9
ð.99Þ ð.97Þ ð.81Þ ð.91Þ ð.00Þ ð.00Þ
DGETI ð%Þ 46.4 50.0 55.0 45.0 33.8 80.1
ð.92Þ ð.81Þ ð.57Þ ð.92Þ ð.20Þ ð.00Þ
Region 1 ð%Þ 35.7 35.0 50.0 50.0 30.8 36.0
Region 2 ð%Þ 39.3 45.0 40.0 35.0 47.0 50.1
Region 3 ð%Þ 17.9 10.0 5.0 10.0 15.4 10.4
Region 4 ð%Þ 7.1 10.0 5.0 5.0 6.8 3.5
ð.94Þ ð.88Þ ð.58Þ ð.76Þ ð.89Þ ð.43Þ
Note.—Numbers in parentheses are as follows: col. 1: p -value for test C5 T15 T25 T3;
col. 2: p -value for test C5 T1; col. 3: p -value for test C5 T2; col. 4: p-value for test C5 T3;
cols. 5 and 6: p -value for test C5 non-ALI schools. For col. 5, like the ALI schools, these are
schools that have one session per day ðmorningÞ; for col. 6, these are schools that have two
sessions per day ðmorning and afternoonÞ. The figures pertain only to the morning session
because data for afternoon sessions were often missing.
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TABLE 2
Ninth-Grade ENLACE: Treatment and Control Schools at Baseline
Variable
C
ð1Þ
T1
ð2Þ
T2
ð3Þ
T3
ð4Þ
9th-grade ENLACE mean test score in
mathematics—fall term enrollees:*
10th-grade class 515.9 519.6 512.6 522.6
ð.86Þ ð.81Þ ð.68Þ ð.57Þ
11th-grade class 516.0 516.6 517.4 524.7
ð.91Þ ð.96Þ ð.86Þ ð.47Þ
% with ENLACE score:
10th-grade class 90.6 88.7 88.8 86.8
ð.30Þ ð.23Þ ð.44Þ ð.08Þ
11th-grade class 78.3 74.0 75.2 75.3
ð.62Þ ð.25Þ ð.37Þ ð.39Þ
Note.—Numbers in parentheses are as follows: col. 1: p-value for test C5 T15 T25 T3;
col. 2: p-value for test C 5 T1; col. 3: p -value for test C 5 T2; col. 4: p-value for test C 5 T3.
All account for school-level clustering.
* The national mean is 500 and the standard deviation is 100.
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Alland regional distribution.12 All the variables in table 1 do not differ from
the control group at conventional levels of statistical significance, an
indication that the randomization procedure was successful. Table 2
compares treatment and control schools on the basis of themean score of
students on the ninth-grade mathematics ENLACE.13 This variable was
unavailable at the time of the randomization. As seen in table 2, themean
score on theninth-gradeENLACEdoes not differ between treatment and
controls at conventional levels of significance, and the largest difference
from the mean score of the control group is less than 7 ð9Þ standardized
points ð0.07 ½0.09of a standarddeviationÞ for the tenth- ðeleventh-Þ grade
class.B. ALI Mathematics Tests
Incentive payments ðsee belowÞ for all treatment regimes depended on
performance on standardizedmathematics tests administered at the end
of the school year. The tests were designed by CENEVAL on the basis of
the input of Mexican experts on upper-secondary school mathematics.1414 CENEVAL is a nongovernmental organization similar to the Educational Testing Ser-
vice in the United States.
12 Oportunidades is a conditional cash transfer program that provides payments for
school attendance to low-income families. DGETI ðDireccio´n General de Educacio´n Tec-
nolo´gica IndustrialÞ schools have an industrial focus and DGETA ðDireccio´n General de
Educacio´n Tecnolo´gica AgropecuariaÞ schools have an agricultural focus.
13 The ENLACE is a national test with separate mathematics and language components
that began in 2007 with only two grades and is now administered each year to students in all
grades between grade 3 and grade 9 and in grade 12.
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aligning learning incentives of students and teachers 335The tests were based on the curriculum in each grade.15 The tests were
administered by the Ministry of Education with procedures designed to
minimize possible testing abuses. In particular, the tests were not ad-
ministered or monitored by school personnel, but by representatives of
the Ministry of Education state offices, with one monitor assigned to
each class and an overall supervisor assigned to the school. The same
administrators collected the answer sheets and were required to account
for all copies of the tests after test administration to reduce the possi-
bility of teaching to the test based on past tests.16
For the purpose of determining incentive payments, performance on
each test was categorized, as in the ninth-grade ENLACE, into four lev-
els: Pre-Basic, Basic, Proficient, and Advanced. A popular method for
determining cutoffs for the categories is the bookmarkmethod, which is
used for the ENLACE ðsee Cizek, Bunch, and Koons 2004Þ. Using that
method with the ALI test scores, in the first program year the percentage
of students scoring in the top two categories was zero for the tenth grade,
4.0 percent for the eleventh grade, and zero for the twelfth grade for the
treatment and control groups combined. The corresponding percent-
ages for the Pre-Basic category were 76.5, 92.3, and 92.8. This perfor-
mance reflects the fact that the test design faithfully adhered to the
curriculum content, which is quite advanced, especially in light of the
low level of pre–high school mathematics skills. Using the bookmark
cutoffs would have resulted in few students or teachers receiving in-
centive payments and almost none receiving the larger payments asso-
ciated with performance in the top two categories. This result would
likely have had a deleterious impact on student and teacher effort in
subsequent years of the program. For this reason, the bookmark pro-
cedure was not used to establish cut scores for determining incentive
payments. Instead, the cut scores for the ALI tests were chosen to mimic
the ninth-grade ENLACE distribution of the control schools for the
tenth and eleventh grades and to mimic the twelfth-grade ENLACE
distribution of the control schools for the twelfth grade.1715 The standardized curriculum for each grade is as follows: grade 10: algebra, geometry,
and trigonometry ðclass hours, 4 hours per weekÞ; grade 11: analytical geometry and dif-
ferential calculus ðclass hours, 4 hours per weekÞ; grade 12: probability and statistics and
applied statistics ðclass hours, 5 hours per weekÞ. In 2010–11, applied statistics was replaced
with integral calculus.
16 Barlevy and Neal ð2011Þ develop a model of teacher effort choice under an incentive
scheme based on the ordinal ranking of students. They show that such a scheme would not
require the equating of assessments over time and would thus eliminate the incentive for
teachers to “teach to the test.” Their framework does not incorporate student effort as a
joint determinant of achievement.
17 The twelfth-grade mathematics ENLACE was administered for the first time in the
2007–8 academic year.
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1. Treatment 1 ðStudent Incentives OnlyÞ
Table 3 shows the incentive payment schedule for students at each grade
level that serves as the basis for treatments 1 and 3. The amount in each
cell represents the payment in pesos for a student with a given level of
performance at the start of the grade ðthe baseline test score as defined
aboveÞ and at the end of the grade.18 Payment levels were intended to be
large enough to be expected to induce behavioral changes. The payments
are similar in magnitude to the attendance incentives given by the Opor-
tunidades program and to a scholarship program offered by the Ministry
of Education.
As seen in the table, in the tenth and eleventh grades, there was no
payment for performance on the ALI tests at the Pre-Basic level. In those
two grades, students who scored at the Pre-Basic level on the baseline test
received a payment of Mex$4,000 ðpesosÞ if they improved to the Basic
level, $9,000 if they improved to the Proficient level, and $15,000 if they
improved to the Advanced level. The increments become progressively
larger ð$4,000 for the first increment, $5,000 for the second, and $6,000
for the thirdÞ, recognizing that the effort necessary to improve from Pre-
Basic to Proficient, for example, is likely to be greater than twice the effort
in going from Pre-Basic to Basic.
In the tenth grade, students who originally scored at the Basic level
received a payment of $2,500 for maintaining their achievement level, a
smaller amount than those at the Pre-Basic level who improved to theBasic
level. The smaller payment reflects the presumably greater effort asso-
ciated with improvement than with maintenance, a premise that is re-
flected throughout the incentive schedule. Considerably larger payments
were given for improvement beyond the original Basic level: $7,500 for
achieving the Proficient level and $13,500 for achieving the Advanced
level. As before, the increments were increasing ð$5,000 for the first and
$6,000 for the secondÞ.
Students in the tenth grade who began at the Proficient level received
no payment if they fell back to the Basic or Pre-Basic level. If they re-
mained at theProficient level, they received $6,000, less than that received
by students who improved to that level, while if they improved to the
Advanced level, they received $12,000. Students who originally scored at
the Advanced level received $4,500 if they fell back to the Proficient level
and $10,500 if they remained at the Advanced level.
Bonus amounts were the same for students in the eleventh grade with
the exception that there was no payment for remaining at the Basic level.18 A dollar was equivalent to about 11 pesos at the time.
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TABLE 3
Schedule of Incentive Payments ðPesosÞ for Student Achievement
End of Grade
Start of Grade Pre-Basic Basic Proficient Advanced
10th grade:
Pre-Basic 0 4,000 9,000 15,000
Basic 0 2,500 7,500 13,500
Proficient 0 0 6,000 12,000
Advanced 0 0 4,500 10,500
11th grade:
Pre-Basic 0 4,000 9,000 15,000
Basic 0 0 7,500 13,500
Proficient 0 0 6,000 12,000
Advanced 0 0 4,500 10,500
12th grade:
Pre-Basic 0 0 5,000 10,000
Basic 0 0 5,000 10,000
Proficient 0 0 5,000 10,000
Advanced 0 0 5,000 10,000
aligning learning incentives of students and teachers 337The lack of any reward to those in the eleventh grade who remained
at the Basic level reflected the ALI program emphasis on making prog-
ress toward achieving proficiency by the end of the twelfth grade. This
formulation does, however, lead to an incentive for tenth graders who
would perform at the Basic level on the tenth- and eleventh-grade tests
to score at the Pre-Basic level on the tenth-grade test instead. In that
case, the student would receive $4,000 in total ð$0 in the tenth grade and
$4,000 in the eleventh gradeÞ as opposed to $2,500 in total ð$2,500 in the
tenth grade and $0 in the eleventh gradeÞ. Of course, students would be
uncertain of their eleventh-grade score and indeed would have been
better off scoring at the Basic level in the tenth grade if their score was at
the Proficient or Advanced level in the eleventh grade. Although the
potential incentive incompatibility could have been avoided by giving a
bonus of $1,500 for remaining at the Basic level in the eleventh grade,
our view was that, given the newness of the ALI test and thus the in-
herent uncertainties students would have about how well they would
perform on the tests ðas well as their uncertainty about the cutoffsÞ, the
saliency of a zero bonus in emphasizing the goal of attaining proficiency
outweighed the potential incentive problem.1919 A more serious issue would arise, particularly if the program were universally adopted,
with respect to performance on the ninth-grade ENLACE, where it would be unequivocally
better for a student faced with the prospect of tenth-grade ALI incentives to have per-
formed at the Pre-Basic level. However, this incentive would be mitigated by the fact that
the ninth-grade ENLACE is a high-stakes test used by high schools as part of their com-
petitive admissions criteria.
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AllThe twelfth-grade payment schedule provided a bonus only for achiev-
ing the Proficient or Advanced levels of performance, reflecting the goal
that students reach at least the Proficient level by the time they graduate.
There was a significantly higher payment for performance at the Ad-
vanced level, $10,000, as opposed to the Proficient level, $5,000.
2. Treatment 2 ðTeacher Incentives OnlyÞ
In treatment 2, mathematics teachers were rewarded for the perfor-
mance of the particular students they taught during the year. The reward
was based on the sum of the rewards earned by the students as described
in table 4. The per-student bonus was 5 percent of the bonus payments
in the student schedules, except for the modification that teachers were
penalized for students in the tenth and eleventh grades who were not at
the Proficient or Advanced level at the end-of-grade test and who per-
formed more poorly on the end-of-grade test than on the baseline test.
Consider, as an example, a teacher who had a tenth-grademathematics
class. For each student who improved from the Pre-Basic to the Basic
level, the teacher would receive $200 ð5 percent of the $4,000 that such
a student would earn for himself or herselfÞ. If such a student instead
improved to the Proficient category, the teacher would earn $450 ðagain
5 percent of the $9,000 the student would receiveÞ. If, however, a student
lost ground, for example, moving from the Basic to the Pre-Basic level,
the total of the student payments used to calculate the teacher reward
would be reduced by $125. A teacher’s total payment was bounded below
by zero.
A teacher with an eleventh-grade mathematics class faced the same
incentive schedule as for a tenth-grade class except that, in conformity
with the student incentive schedule, there was no payment for a student
whose starting and ending test scores were at the Basic level. A teacher
with a twelfth-grade class received $250 for each student who reached
the Proficient level and $500 for each student who reached the Ad-
vanced level ð5 percent of the student paymentÞ.
Schools operate on a semester basis. To obtain the academic year ðtwo-
semesterÞ sum, each student whom the teacher had in his class during a
semester was counted as one-half a student. The total earned by a teacher
was the sum of the earnings from all the students in that teacher’s classes
over both semesters. To get an idea of the magnitude of the payments,
consider a full-time teacher, one teaching five classes in each semester, who
had 200 ðyear-equivalentÞ students ðan average class size each semester of
40 studentsÞ. Suppose that the average student payment was $2,500 and
that no student fell back. Such a teacher would earn $25,000, which is a
bonus of between 10 and 15 percent of the annual salary of a teacher in a
federal high school.This content downloaded from 128.042.187.224 on May 25, 2017 12:58:04 PM
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TABLE 4
Schedule of Incentive Payments ðPesosÞ per Student
for Mathematics Teachers
End of Grade
Start of Grade Pre-Basic Basic Proficient Advanced
10th grade:
Pre-Basic 0 200 450 750
Basic 2125 125 375 675
Proficient 2125 2125 300 600
Advanced 2125 2125 225 525
11th grade:
Pre-Basic 0 200 450 750
Basic 2125 0 375 675
Proficient 2125 2125 300 600
Advanced 2125 2125 225 525
12th grade:
Pre-Basic 0 0 250 500
Basic 0 0 250 500
Proficient 0 0 250 500
Advanced 0 0 250 500
aligning learning incentives of students and teachers 339A specific aim of the teacher incentives design was to avoid teachers
concentrating their effort on high-performing students.20 It did so in
three ways. First, teachers gained more from a lower-performing student
achieving a given level than from a higher-performing student achieving
that same level; for example, a teacher with a tenth-grade class earned
$200 if a student who scored initially at the Pre-Basic level improved to a
Basic level but only $125 for a student who scored initially at the Basic
level and remained there. As with the students, the teacher effort re-
quired to elicit an improvement in a student initially scoring at the Pre-
Basic level is presumably greater than the effort to maintain the score of
the Basic-level student. As seen in table 4, the $75 differential between
initial Pre-Basic and Basic test scores carried over to the other final test
categories. It also carried over between any two adjacent initial test score
categories, that is, between Basic and Proficient and between Proficient
and Advanced. This pattern resulted in a doubling of the differential
between a student initially scoring at the Pre-Basic level and improving
to the Proficient level and a student initially scoring at the Advanced
level and falling back to the Proficient level ð$450 vs. $225Þ.
Second, and opposite to the “carrot” that compensated teachers for
the extra effort associated with improving scores of low-performing
students, the $125 penalty incurred if a student regressed acts as a “stick”20 Neal and Schanzenbach ð2010Þ use data from No Child Left Behind to analyze how
teachers may have incentives to concentrate on subsets of students, in their case, students
near cutoff values that determine whether school-level goals are met.
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Allaimed at maintaining students at least at their initial performance level.
Third, for students initially at the Pre-Basic level, the possible payments
to the teachers ðand to the studentsÞ were strictly nonnegative, with
relatively larger payments if the students improved a great deal. For ex-
ample, the mathematics teacher received $200 if a student who started
at Pre-Basic in the tenth grade advanced to Basic, $450 if a student who
started at Pre-Basic advanced to Proficient, and $750 if a student who
started at Pre-Basic advanced to Advanced.
In contrast to the ALI design, in an incentive system that depended
on, say, the average performance of teachers’ students, teachers would
receive a greater reward if low-performing students were encouraged to
not take the examination. Under the ALI design, that was not the case
for the lowest-performing students; those who scored Pre-Basic in the
baseline test could not subtract from the teacher’s reward and, as noted,
could contribute considerably if their performance improved in the
end-of-year test. For students with Basic and Proficient baseline scores,
there was some potential for teachers losing if the students dropped
back because of the “stick,” but the “carrot” was intended to be sufficient
to offset that potential loss.
3. Treatment 3 ðAligned Student, Teacher,
and Administrator IncentivesÞ
Students.—In treatment 3, in the tenth and eleventh grades, each stu-
dent received a reward based on individual performance as in treatment 1
ðaccording to the schedule in table 4Þ and also on the performance of
the other students in his or her mathematics class. In the twelfth grade,
the student received a reward based only on individual performance. The
first component was calculated in exactly the same way as in treatment 1.
The second componentwas calculated as afixedproportion, 1percent, of
the total payments earned by classmates.21
The rationale for paying students for the performance of their class-
mates rests on possible synergies of two different kinds, both of which
depend on there being a fundamental complementarity between a stu-
dent’s own effort and classmates’ efforts. In one case, the effort of one’s
classmates is a pure externality in which a positive climate or culture of
learning can be created by the overall effort within the classroom. This
climate affects the amount of effort each student puts into his own learn-
ing. A second synergy arises when students actively help other students,
for example, if higher-performing students tutor lower-performing stu-21 In calculating the class sum over a year’s time, the class sums in each of the two
semesters are multiplied by one-half and then added together. This procedure accounts for
compositional changes in classes, i.e., that a student may not be in classes with the same
students in both semesters.
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aligning learning incentives of students and teachers 341dents. The component of the bonus payment based on class performance
provided an ðextraÞ incentive for this behavior. Not onlymay such activities
improve learning among low performers; they may also improve learning
among high performers as teaching itself can lead to a deeper under-
standing.
Mathematics teachers.—The reward to full-time mathematics teachers
was the sum of the total performance payments earned by the students in
their classes calculated as in treatment 2 ðaccording to the schedule in
table 4Þ and a fixed proportion, 25 percent, of the average full-time-
equivalent adjusted performance payments earned by the other mathe-
matics teachers ðacross all grade levelsÞ.22 The rationale for the second
component of the reward was to stimulate cooperation among the math-
ematics teachers. Such cooperation may take the form of formal or infor-
mal discussions of teaching methods and subject matter, mentoring less
experienced teachers, and directly sharing lesson plans or other class
materials.
Nonmathematics teachers.—Nonmathematics teachers received a cash
payment that is 25 percent of the schoolwide average ðfull-time-equivalentÞ
mathematics teacher performance payment. Payments for part-time teach-
ers were adjusted for their own full-time equivalence status. The ratio-
nale for this payment recognizes the potential importance of the overall
learning environment in the school and of the potential value of inter-
actions among teachers from different disciplines in sharing ideas about
pedagogy ðand perhaps subject matter in the case of allied fields like phys-
icsÞ and about students that they have in common.
Principals and associate principals.—Principals received a cash payment
that is 50 percent of the average full-time-equivalent mathematics teacher
performance payment. Associate principals received a cash payment that
is 25 percent of the schoolwide average full-time-equivalent mathematics
teacher performance payment, adjusted for their own full-time equiva-
lence status. These payments recognize the importance of support ser-
vices provided by administrative personnel in fostering learning within
the school.23IV. Results
A. ALI Test Completion Rates
Most students in Mexico who complete ninth grade enter high school
ðtenth gradeÞ. Of the cohort that entered kindergarten in 1996, about
65 percent completed ninth grade and 95 percent of those continued to22 Rewards to part-time teachers were prorated by their own full-time equivalence status.
23 The formulas used for calculating the bonuses for students, mathematics teachers,
nonmathematics teachers, principals, and associate principals are given in App. B.
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Alltenth grade. However, only 76 percent of those who entered tenth grade
actually completed the grade, and of those, 81 percent graduated from
high school. Given high dropout rates at the national level, one might
expect to see a significant proportion of students in the ALI schools who
begin the school year but do not take the ALI examination at the end of
the year. To the extent that attrition is not uniform across the treatment
and control schools, treatment effect estimates based on simple mean
comparisons could be biased.
Table 5 provides attrition figures for the 2008–9 tenth-grade cohort,
both for enrollment between the first two ðyear 1Þ semesters and for the
completion of the ALI tests over the three years. The first row of figures
shows the percentage of students in treatment and control schools en-
rolled in the fall semester who were also enrolled in the spring semester.
Attrition between the fall and spring semesters is 9.9 percent for the
controls and 12.0, 9.5, and 13.2 percent for T1, T2, and T3; none of the
differences are statistically significant at conventional levels. The fact
that continuation rates do not differ significantly either in magnitude or
statistically across the treatment and control groups may be surprising,
particularly for T1 and T3, where students receive direct monetary in-
centives. Indeed, one might have expected the ALI program to have
reduced dropout rates. However, as already noted, ALI is not the only
program providing attendance incentives. Almost 40 percent of the
students in ALI schools receive a substantial attendance subsidy as part
of the Oportunidades conditional cash transfer program. In addition, as
part of another scholarship program, students whose family income is
below the poverty line and who successfully progress from one grade toTABLE 5
Continuation Rates and ALI Test Completion Rates
for Tenth Grade, Year 1 Cohort
Control
Schools
ð1Þ
Treatment 1
Schools
ð2Þ
Treatment 2
Schools
ð3Þ
Treatment 3
Schools
ð4Þ
% enrolled in spring of year 1
given enrollment in the fall 90.1 88.0 90.5 86.8
ð.384Þ ð.851Þ ð.203Þ
% taking ALI exam in year 1 given
enrollment in both semesters 85.9 88.9 85.6 88.6
ð.255Þ ð.926Þ ð.388Þ
% taking ALI exam in year 2
given test taken in year 1 7.74 8.19 7.69 8.08
ð.053Þ ð.820Þ ð.172Þ
% taking ALI exam in year 3
given test taken in year 1 6.78 7.09 6.64 7.03
ð.317Þ ð.567Þ ð.375Þ
Note.—Numbers in parentheses are as follows: col. 2: p -value for test C 5 T1; col. 3
p -value for test C 5 T2; col. 4: p -value for test C 5 T3. All account for school-level clustering
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aligning learning incentives of students and teachers 343another receive a scholarship payment; the baseline scholarship amount
is considerable, with increments for achieving a high grade point aver-
age. Given these subsidies already in place in all federal high schools, it is
less surprising that there is no discernible additional effect of the ALI
program on the dropout rate between semesters. The existence of these
additional programs does not pose a problem for the estimation of the
marginal effect of the ALI program, although it could affect the gen-
eralizability of the ALI program impact results to other settings.24
As also seen in table 5, conditional on enrollment in both semesters,
85.9 percent of the controls took the ALI exam, about the same as for
T2, but about 3 percentage points lower than for T1 and T3; again, the
differences from the control group are not statistically significant. This
pattern of test taking is maintained in years 2 and 3. For example, 67.8 per-
cent of the controls who took the ALI exam in year 1 as tenth graders
also took the exam in year 3 as twelfth graders. The comparable figures
for T1, T2, and T3 are 70.9, 66.4, and 70.3 percent, which do not differ
statistically from the controls. We previously noted that there is poten-
tially an incentive for teachers in T2 and T3 schools to try to identify
students in the tenth and eleventh grades who would do worse on the
ALI test than on the baseline ninth-grade ENLACE test and in some way
have them not take the ALI test. However, T3 students cannot lose
anything by taking the test, which acts to counterbalance the teacher
incentive. Moreover, the poorest-performing students on the ENLACE
test, those who scored at the Pre-Basic level, cannot fall back, so there is
no incentive for the teachers in T2 or T3 to discourage them from taking
the test.25 Given the data in table 5, it does not appear that teachers ma-
nipulated the test-taking sample in any appreciable way.B. Treatment Effects
As we discussed, the protocol for the administration of the ALI test,
which called for an external monitor in each classroom, was intended to
minimize the possibility of cheating. To determine whether and to what
extent cheating had occurred, an independent statistical analysis of
student answer sheets was conducted by George Wesolowsky, based on24 Recall from table 2 that the percentage of Oportunidades recipients did not differ
between the treatment and control schools. Student self-reports in year 3 indicate that the
percentage of students receiving a Minister of Public Education scholarship ranges between
11 and 13 percent across the treatment and control groups.
25 In addition, teachers are not officially informed of student ninth-grade ENLACE
scores, which is relevant for determining teacher bonuses for the tenth grade ðand for the
eleventh grade in the first yearÞ, nor are they informed about the ALI test score results of
individual students, which is relevant for determining teacher bonuses for the eleventh
grade.
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Allthe methods described in his 2000 study.26 The method specifies a statis-
tical model for the probability that student i correctly answers multiple-
choice question j, incorporating a parametric function of the “difficulty”
of the question and the “ability” of the student. Using that model, it is
possible to determine, for every pair of students and for each question,
the probability that two students will have the same answer assuming that
all wrong answers are equally likely. With a critical value for the number
of observed matches chosen, the null hypothesis of no copying was tested
for each student pair. The critical value was based on a Bonferroni cor-
rection such that the probability was one that at least one pair of students
would be falsely accused. Given that criterion, we interpret the amount
of cheating that is identified as an upper bound.27
In each pair, we assigned the student with the higher ninth-grade
ENLACE score as the source of the answers and the other student as a
“copier.”28 If a student is ever a copier in any pair, even if the student was
a source in another pair, the student’s final designation is as a copier.
Table 6 provides the results from the cheating analysis. The table re-
ports, for each grade and programmatic year, the percentage of students
who were members of a cheating pair and the percentage who were
copiers.29 The estimated ðupper-boundÞ percentage of copiers in the
control group varied between 2 and 6 percent, depending on grade and
year, with no obvious pattern across grades or years. The extent of copy-
ing was similar for students in T2, who, like the controls, had no direct
ALI incentive. However, the percentage of copiers was considerably higher
and of similar magnitudes in both T1 and T3, the treatments for which
there were direct student incentives. The percentage of copiers was espe-26 To our knowledge, student copying has not been studied in relation to student
incentive performance programs. However, the education literature demonstrates that a
significant fraction of students admit to cheating during regular school examinations
ðCisek 1999Þ.
27 The analysis compared pairs of students within a grade independently of treatment
group, school, or class. The number of pairs identified who were not in the same treatment
group or school was always negligible, supporting the validity of the method. However, that
was not always the case across classes, indicative of the relatively low critical value used to
determine cheating pairs. In particular, 6.0 percent of cheating pairs crossed class boundaries
in year 2 for grade 12, 9.8 percent in year 1 for grade 12, 14.4 percent in year 3 for grade 11,
and 29.2 percent in year 3 for grade 12. Unfortunately, we cannot rule out that in some cases
classes were combined for the test administration, though no such occurrences were re-
ported by the overall external supervisor assigned to the school.
28 To determine the accuracy of this classification, we compared the difference between
the ninth-grade ENLACE and the ALI test scores for three groups: noncheaters, sources,
and copiers. In essentially all years, grades, and treatment groups, the difference in scores
for copiers was far greater than for the other two groups, which were themselves similar. For
example, in year 2 among the controls, the difference between the scores was 234 for
noncheaters, 240 for sources, and 53 for the copiers. The similar figures for T3 were 8.9,
21.2, and 190.8. In defining copiers, for cases in which the ninth-grade ENLACE was
missing, the assignment was based on the ALI test score.
29 The average percentage of copiers is more than half the percentage of all cheaters
because some students were sources for more than one copier.
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TABLE 6
Percentage of Students with Nonindependent Test Scores
by Year, Grade, and Treatment
Grade 10 Grade 11 Grade 12
Copiers
ð%Þ
Cheaters
ð%Þ
Copiers
ð%Þ
Cheaters
ð%Þ
Copiers
ð%Þ
Cheaters
ð%Þ
Year 1:
C 3.7 6.4 4.5 7.8 5.7 9.3
T1 5.1 9.1 10.9 14.9 5.2 8.4
T2 3.4 5.8 3.9 6.5 3.7 6.5
T3 3.7 6.7 10.1 14.9 2.7 4.7
Year 2:
C 3.5 6.1 3.6 6.2 2.4 4.5
T1 6.4 11.0 19.1 27.6 12.7 17.3
T2 4.3 7.4 6.2 9.8 3.4 5.5
T3 6.6 10.6 17.2 23.9 10.6 16.0
Year 3:
C 3.1 5.7 4.6 7.8 2.5 4.7
T1 8.1 13.2 19.8 28.2 17.5 24.7
T2 4.2 7.3 4.1 7.1 4.0 6.8
T3 10.3 16.2 23.8 31.3 15.4 21.3
aligning learning incentives of students and teachers 345cially high for the eleventh grade in years 2 and 3 and for the twelfth grade
in year 3; the highest percentage of copiers was for the eleventh grade in
year 3, 19.8 percent for T1 and 23.8 percent for T3.30
As noted, teachers did not administer the test or handle the test
booklets, and all test copies were to be returned to the state ministry
offices. The finding that the extent of cheating was no greater in T2 than
in C nor greater in T3 than in T1 is consistent with that protocol being
followed.31 In addition, we analyzed the difference in scores between
treatment and control schools based on the “anchor” questions, that is,
the 30 percent of questions that were repeated each year.32 Larger treat-
ment effects based on those questions alonemight indicate that teachers
somehow gained access to the tests and used them to teach to the test
in subsequent years. However, we found the treatment effects ðeither
adjusted for cheating or unadjustedÞ to be no larger for the anchor ques-
tions.
Given the results of the cheating analysis, we report average treatment
effects in table 7 both with and without an adjustment to the ALI scores30 Cheating was highly concentrated among a few schools. In many cases, the top three
schools accounted for three times as many copiers in the treatment groups in a given year
and grade as the schools accounted for the total number of students. At the extreme, e.g.,
the top three T1 schools in year 2 for grade 11 accounted for 73.3 percent of the copiers
and only 21.7 percent of all of the students.
31 For an analysis of teacher cheating, see Jacob and Levitt ð2003Þ.
32 Anchor questions are not supposed to be more or less difficult than other questions.
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aligning learning incentives of students and teachers 347of the copiers. The treatment effects are based on standardized test
scores, normalized ðas in the ENLACEÞ to have a mean of 500 and a
standard deviation of 100 for the controls. The predicted ALI test scores
for copiers in grades 10 and 11 are based on regressions of the ALI
scores of the control students ðwho were not copiersÞ on their ninth-
grade ENLACE score and a dummy variable for a missing ENLACE
score; for the twelfth grade, the regression included in addition the
student’s twelfth-grade ENLACE score and a missing dummy.
There are five tenth-grade entry cohorts that are observed in different
grades over the three years of the ALI program. For example, the 2006–7
tenth-grade entry cohort was observed only once, in the twelfth grade
in year 1, and the 2007–8 cohort was observed twice, in the eleventh
grade in year 1 and in the twelfth grade in year 2. The samples for each
cohort shown in table 7 are based on nonattriters over the years each
cohort is observed.33 The average treatment effect is the difference in
the mean test score of each treatment and the control group condi-
tioning on the following preprogram school-level variables to increase
precision: the schoolwide average ninth-grade mathematics ENLACE
scores for the current tenth-, eleventh-, and twelfth-grade students; the
2007–8 academic year average twelfth-grade mathematics and language
ENLACE scores; regional dummies; and state dummies ðfor the five
states in which there was at least one school in each ALI groupÞ. Stan-
dard errors account for clustering at the school level. The estimates with
the adjustment represent, in our view, a reasonable lower bound on
treatment effects.34
In year 1, as seen, the adjusted and unadjusted treatment effects are
very close for grade 10. On the basis of the adjusted estimates, T3 students
in the tenth grade scored 31.4 standardized points higher, on average,
than did C students and T1 students 16.9 standardized points higher.35
A 95 percent confidence interval for T3 ranges from 19.8 to 43.0 points
and for T1 from 7.1 to 26.7. The score for T2 students is almost identi-
cal to that of C students ðthe point estimate is 1.27 points ½SE 5.74Þ. The
p -value for the ðtwo-sidedÞ test that the T3 treatment effect differs from
the T1 effect is .010 and that for the test of T3 against T2, less than .001.
The adjusted and unadjusted estimates diverge slightly for grade 10 in
year 2. With the more conservative adjusted estimates, the T3 treatment
increases test scores by 46.6 standardized points over the controls and the33 The results are not sensitive to the exclusion of attriters. As discussed, attrition was
similar across the treatment and control groups.
34 In App. table C1, we report results in which the ALI scores of copiers were set equal to
the 25th percentile score of the control group students who were noncopiers. The results
do not differ much for tenth grade in all years and for eleventh and twelfth grades in year 1.
The magnitudes of the treatment effects for the upper two grades in years 2 and 3 are
somewhat smaller than those reported in table 7.
35 Each standardized point represents 0.01 of a standard deviation.
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AllT1 treatment by 29.1 points. As in year 1, the T2 treatment has no effect
on test scores. Both the T3 and T1 effects have relatively narrow 95 per-
cent confidence intervals, and the difference between T3 and T1 is sta-
tistically significant. A larger difference between the adjusted and unad-
justed treatment effects emerges in year 3, with the adjusted effects being
about 25 percent lower. The adjusted treatment effects are 63.4 points
for T3, 32.3 for T1, and 13.5 for T2 ðthe only time when there is a statis-
tically significant T2 effect across all grades and yearsÞ.
There are a number of reasons why the program effect, as seen, would
be expected to grow over time. First, the schools were not informed of
the ALI program until well into the first semester of the first year, and it
took some time after that for the students to be apprised of the program
details. Second, the only information given to the students and teachers
about the test was that it would adhere strictly to the curriculum of each
grade. In the first year, there would be considerable uncertainty about
the format and difficulty of the test for both students and teachers. Having
experience with the test in the first year would resolve some of that un-
certainty, even though the tests themselves were not left behind to mini-
mize the possibility of teaching to the test.
The eleventh- and twelfth-grade results in many ways mimic those of
the tenth grade. The adjusted treatment effects are larger in years 2 and
3 than in year 1 and of a magnitude similar to those for the tenth grade.
Estimated treatment effects are larger for T3 than for T1, each is pre-
cisely estimated, and they are statistically distinguishable. There is no
discernible T2 effect. In year 2 ð3Þ, on the basis of the adjusted estimates,
T3 students in the eleventh grade scored 43.7 ð42.1Þ standardized points
higher, on average, than did the C students, and twelfth graders 34.8
ð56.7Þ points higher.
1. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
Gender.—Table 8 reports both adjusted and unadjusted average treat-
ment effects for the 2008–9 tenth-grade cohort for each of the three years
of the program by gender. Recall that this sample consists of students who
took the ALI test in all three years. There is little gender difference in
average treatment effects at any grade.
Ninth-grade ENLACE.—Table 8 also reports average treatment effects
for this cohort distinguished by performance on the ninth-grade ENLACE.
Recall that the incentive schedule was designed so that low-performing
students would have a larger incentive to improve their mathematics
knowledge, owing to the presumed greater effort necessary to achieve any
standard, and teachers would not have an incentive to specialize their
efforts on higher-performing students. Table 8 provides evidence on
whether the incentive design accomplished these goals.This content downloaded from 128.042.187.224 on May 25, 2017 12:58:04 PM
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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AllALI incentives induced significant increases in test scores across all
ninth-grade ENLACE performance categories: Pre-Basic, Basic, and Pro-
ficient and Advanced combined. Concentrating on the adjusted esti-
mates, the T3 treatment effect for those students in the Pre-Basic ENLACE
category was 26.8 points in the tenth grade, 33.4 points in the eleventh
grade, and 50.7 points in the twelfth grade. The comparable effects for
T1 were 15.0, 24.4, and 23.6. Those students scoring in the Basic cate-
gory on the ENLACE scored higher than students in the Pre-Basic cat-
egory in the tenth and eleventh grades, but about the same in the twelfth
grade. Students scoring in the two highest ENLACE categories have the
highest treatment effects: 28.0, 47.3, and 45.6 for T1 in the three grades
and 45.3, 58.1, and 70.2 in T3 for the three grades. Treatment 2 effects
for all ENLACE categories and in all grades are small, in a few cases
negative, and not statistically significant.B. Potential Caveats
Test-taking effort.—The estimated treatment effects for T1 and T3, even
those that are adjusted for copying, appear to be large relative to the
literature, especially for T3 in year 3. An implicit assumption is that the
test-taking effort of the students in the control schools ðand to some
extent the T2 schoolsÞ is the same as that of the students in the T1 and
T3 schools. Given that the ALI test is a low-stakes ðif not a no-stakesÞ test
for the C students, it is possible that the average treatment effects are
exaggerated. Some evidence can be brought to bear on the issue.
We use two methods to obtain a lower bound on the treatment effects
that accounts for differential test-taking effort, in one case a lower
bound only for T3 and in the other for both T1 and T3. The first method
assumes that the test-taking effort of T1 students is no less than that of
T3 students. Although there are greater monetary incentives for T3
students and teachers due to group incentives and administrators are
also rewarded, it seems reasonable to assume that the incentives for the
students in T1 are substantial enough for students to want to maximize
their effort on the test. Under that assumption and also assuming that
the entire difference between the test outcome of T1 and C students in
each year is due to a lack of test-taking effort on the part of the controls,
the difference in the treatment effect between T3 and T1 would be a
lower-bound estimate of the treatment effect for T3. The results in ta-
ble 7 ðwith the copying adjustmentÞ imply that, for year 3, the lower
bound for the treatment effect for T3 is 31.1 ð63.4 2 32.3Þ standardized
points for grade 10, 16.9 for grade 11, and 33.9 for grade 12.
The second method assumes that test-taking effort of the students in
the control schools is at least as great in year 3 as in year 1 and, further,
that the treatment effect for T1 in year 1 was entirely due to the lack ofThis content downloaded from 128.042.187.224 on May 25, 2017 12:58:04 PM
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
aligning learning incentives of students and teachers 351test-taking effort of the controls, that is, that the true treatment effect in
year 1 was zero for T1. In that case, a lower-bound estimate of the
treatment effect is the difference between the treatment effect in year 3
and the treatment effect of T1 students in year 1. This assumption leads
to the following lower-bound estimates of treatment effects ðadjusted
for copyingÞ: in year 3 for T1, 15.4 for the tenth grade, 11.6 for the
eleventh grade, and 13.1 for the twelfth grade. Similarly, the lower-bound
estimates for T3 are 46.5 for the tenth grade, 28.5 for the eleventh grade,
and 47.0 for the twelfth grade.
Clearly, the first bounding approach is more severe in terms of the
influence of the lack of test-taking effort on treatment effects, implying
as it does a zero treatment effect for T1 in all three years and thus, given
the increased performance of T1 students over time, a sizable reduction
in test-taking effort of the controls in year 3 relative to year 1. Perhaps
one could make an argument that the twelfth graders, who, in year 3,
were taking the ALI test for the third time, and the eleventh graders for
the second time, had diminished test effort, but such an argument is less
compelling for the tenth-grade students in year 3 who were taking the
ALI test for the first time. Indeed, raw scores ðthe percentage of ques-
tions answered correctlyÞ for the control school students were similar in
all three years in any of the grades, which is consistent with a constant
level of test-taking effort as assumed in the second set of lower-bound
estimates.
Twelfth-grade ENLACE.—In the middle of the spring semester of the
twelfth grade, students are administered a national mathematics “com-
petency” test. The scores of the students in the ALI schools, which were
made available to us, can be used to see whether the effects of the treat-
ments on the curriculum-based ALI tests carry over to the twelfth-grade
ENLACE. On the basis of the same regression specification as in table 7,
the treatment effect estimates for the twelfth-grade students in year 3 of
the ALI program were ðstandard errors in parenthesesÞ 219.1 ð9.12Þ for
T1,215.6 ð9.12Þ for T2, and 18.3 ð13.7Þ for T3. Not only are these results
quite different from those for the ALI exam, but the negative and statis-
tically significant effect for T1 ðgiven the randomizationÞ is anomalous.
Whether these results are due to the very different content of the ALI and
ENLACE tests or perhaps to diminished test-taking effort, particularly for
the T1 and T3 students who are concentrating their effort and attention
on the end-of-year ALI tests, is unclear.
Translation to raw percentage scores.—Measured in standard deviation
units, the treatment effects estimated under the ALI experiment are
large relative to the range of estimates reported in the experimental
incentives literature. However, as measured by raw percentage scores,
the performance of the treatment groups is less striking. For example,
for the 2008/9 cohort, students in T3 ðT1Þ answer only 45.3 ð43.6Þ percentThis content downloaded from 128.042.187.224 on May 25, 2017 12:58:04 PM
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Allof the questions correctly on the tenth-grade test as compared to 41.7 per-
cent for the controls. Similarly, on the eleventh-grade test, the average
score for the T3 ðT1Þ students is 42.8 ð41.3Þ versus 38.2 for the control
students, and on the twelfth-grade test, the T3 ðT1Þ score was 48.4 ð45.1Þ
as opposed to the control average score of 42.9. As previously noted, the
test covered the curriculum for each grade. Although students in T3 and
T1 gain relative to controls, in absolute terms they master less than half
of the curriculum.
3. Student and Teacher Effort
As part of the ALI project, students and teachers participating in the ALI
program were given ðself-administered paperÞ questionnaires that at-
tempted tomeasure learning and teaching effort in each semester of each
year. Table 9 compares the survey answers in year 3 across the control and
treatment groups for the students who took the ALI test and responded
to the survey and whose teachers also responded to the survey ðwhich is
true for about 90 percent of the students who took the examÞ. The esti-
mated treatment-control differences are broadly consistent with students
in T1 and T3 groups having higher levels of effort than those in the
control group and with students in the T2 group behaving very similarly
to the controls. For example, students in T1 and T3 spent more time
studying mathematics, were significantly less likely to text or watch tele-
vision while doing homework, were significantly more likely to give help
to classmates, and to put “much effort” into their school work. Students
in T1 and T3 also reported spending no less time studying subjects other
than mathematics, which implies that the ALI incentives did not appear
to have shifted study effort away from other subjects.
Table 9 also compares measures of teacher effort. The evidence is
mixed on whether teachers in the treatment groups exerted more effort.
A higher fraction of teachers in the treatment groups reported prepar-
ing their students for the ALI exams and helping their students outside
of class to prepare for the exam, with the highest fractions observed in
the T3 group. However, there were a number of measures related to time
spent preparing for class ðnot shown in the tableÞ in which no difference
was observed between the different groups of teachers.C. Rationalizing the Results with a Model of Student and Teacher Effort Choice
A perhaps puzzling feature of the results is the large differential between
T3 and T1 effects and a zero effect of T2. One potential explanation is
that T3 is not simply a combination of T1 and T2 given that T3 includes
bonuses for students and mathematics teacher based on the perfor-
mance of peers and for nonmathematics teachers and administrators. ItThis content downloaded from 128.042.187.224 on May 25, 2017 12:58:04 PM
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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Allshould be noted, however, that the bonuses based on peer performance
account for only about 25 percent of the total bonus for both students
and teachers. Given the large differential between T1 and T3 treatment
effects in many cases, it may seem implausible that it is mostly due to the
additional elements in T3 beyond the incentives for student and teacher
own performance.
It is useful to ask whether this pattern of results can be generated by a
model of the determination of student performance. To that end, we
consider a strategic model of the effort choices of the students in a class
and of the teacher. Each student, s, begins a grade with a given level of
knowledge, denoted by k0s, and the teacher, t, with a given stock of
instructional capital, k0t. During the school year, each student supplies
learning effort, εs, and the teacher supplies instructional effort, εt , which
is a public input. End-of-year knowledge, Ks, is given by the production
function
Ks 5 F ðεs; εt ; k0s ; k0t ; SÞ; ð1Þ
where S is the size of the class. Students care about their end-of-year
knowledge and teachers about the knowledge of the students in their
class. Students and the teacher face effort cost functions csðεsÞ and ctðεtÞ.
Each student in the class maximizes
Vs 5 UsðKsÞ2 csðεsÞ; ð2Þ
where UsðKsÞ is the utility the student receives from end-of-year knowl-
edge, and the teacher maximizes
Vt 5 UtðK sÞ2 ctðεtÞ; ð3Þ
where Ks is the class vector of student end-of-year knowledge ðdeter-
mined by ½1 for each studentÞ.36 Student and/or teacher bonuses can be
accommodated in the model by augmenting the student and teacher
utility functions to include the ALI bonus schedules.
Todd and Wolpin ð2012Þ develop sufficient conditions, in which stu-
dents and the teacher play a Nash game, that can generate the ALI results
and an estimation method to empirically implement the model. The
critical assumptions are ð1Þ the student can supply aminimal level of effort
at zero cost but must pay a fixed ðand variableÞ cost for supplying effort
above thatminimal level, ð2Þ themarginal product of the teacher’s effort is
zero if the student chooses to supply onlyminimumeffort, and ð3Þ student
and teacher effort are complementary inputs in equation ð1Þ. Given these36 One also could allow the teacher and/or student utility to depend on initial knowl-
edge or value added.
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aligning learning incentives of students and teachers 355assumptions, a teacher bonus alone may not be sufficient to induce
enough students within a class, who without the bonus were supplying
minimum effort, to supply above-minimum effort in response to an
increase in teacher effort ðgiven complementarity of student and teacher
effortÞ. A student bonus alone, given that it directly affects student in-
centives, can induce such a response and will also increase teacher effort
ðgiven complementarityÞ. Once a student bonus is in place and students
are supplying above-minimum effort, an additional teacher bonus can
further augment both teacher and student effort. It is thus possible to
observe that the T22 C difference is zero, and both the T12 C effect and
the T32 T1 effect are positive. Alternatively, it is possible to generate the
ALI results through restrictions on the shape of the production function.
Such an explanation would seem to require a significant degree of non-
convexity ðakin to a fixed costÞ.
Within any class, the solution of the model depends on the teacher’s
preference over each student’s end-of-year knowledge, the teacher’s in-
structional capital and effort cost, and the distribution within the class of
student initial knowledge, preferences over knowledge, and effort costs.
In the ALI project, as noted, we collected information from surveys of
teachers and students that provide measures and determinants of these
characteristics across all the schools and classes. Todd andWolpin ð2012Þ
exploit those data to estimate a version of the model that allows for het-
erogeneity across schools, teachers, and students in these attributes. Ex-
trapolating the ALI results to other populations in which the distributions
of these attributes differ would require specifying how they differ and
related data to account for those differences. The model provides the
framework for the data collection that would be necessary.D. The Cost of the Treatments
Table 10 summarizes the program cost in terms of the incentive pay-
ments for the second year and for each of the three treatments.
Treatment 3.—Tenth-grade students in T3 on average earned $2,991
based on their own performance and an additional $1,108 based on the
performance of the students in their class. Thus, the class contribution
was about 25 percent of the total. Eleventh-grade students earned $2,679,
on average, from their own performance, lower than what tenth-grade
students received primarily because there was no payment for students
who performed at the Basic level on the baseline ENLACE test and on
the ALI test. They earned an additional $861 from the performance of
their classmates. Twelfth graders earned, on average, $991, less than the
other grades because their payment was contingent on scoring at least at
the Proficient level; there was no additional payment for the perfor-
mance of classmates.This content downloaded from 128.042.187.224 on May 25, 2017 12:58:04 PM
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TABLE 10
Percentage Receiving Payment and Incentive Payment Cost ðPesosÞ: Year 2
Treatment 3 Treatment 1 Treatment 2
% of students receiving payment:
Grade 10:
For own performance 64.6 58.8
For class performance 100.0 . . .
Grade 11:
For own performance 41.3 38.8
For class performance 99.4 . . .
Grade 12:
For own performance 17.3 15.3
Mean student payment:
Grade 10:
For own performance 2,991 2,515
For class performance 1,108 . . .
Total 4,099 2,515
Grade 11:
For own performance 2,679 2,541
For class performance 861 . . .
Total 3,540 2,541
Grade 12:
For own performance 991 915
% of teachers receiving payment:
For own performance 97.2 93.5
For class performance 100.0 . . .
Mean math teacher payment ðFTEÞ:
For own performance 15,330 6,332
For other teacher performance 3,779 . . .
Total 19,109 6,332
Mean nonmath teacher and assistant
director payments:
Payment per FTE 3,872 . . .
Mean director payments:
Payment per director 7,744 . . .
Incentive payment cost per student 3,303 2,080 43
Amount controls would receive 1,643 1,163 44
% of total 49.7 55.9 100
356 journal of political economy
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performance of the students in their classes and an additional $3,779 for
the performance of the students taught by the other mathematics teachers
in the school. Each full-time-equivalent nonmathematics teacher or assis-
tant principal received $3,872 and the principal received $7,744.
Taken together, the cost per student was $3,303 ðabout US$275Þ,
about 15 percent of the current per-student expenditure in federal
upper-secondary schools.
Treatment 1.—Tenth-grade students in T1 received $2,515, eleventh-
grade students $2,541, and twelfth-grade students $915. The cost per
student was $2,080, about 10 percent of the current per-student annual
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aligning learning incentives of students and teachers 357Treatment 2.—Full-time mathematics teachers received, on average,
$6,332 for the performance of the students in their classes. The cost per
student was $43.
A part of the incentive payments of the ALI program is “wasted” in the
sense that some students were paid for results that would have been
achieved without the incentive. It is possible to compute themagnitude of
the waste on the basis of the payments the C students would have received
under the different treatments using the transition rates between the ALI
score categories for the C students. For example, of those C students who
scored at the Pre-Basic level on the ninth-grade ENLACE, 24.0 percent
jumped at least one category on the tenth-grade ALI test, thus earning
a reward in the hypothetical case that they had been in the T1 or T3
treatment. Of course, had they been in one of those treatments, our
estimates indicate that many more would have jumped to a higher cat-
egory, and some of those who jumped one category would have instead
jumped two or three. Nevertheless, these students would have been re-
warded, in at least some part, for an outcome that would have been
achieved without the treatment. As seen in table 10, the waste is sub-
stantial, amounting to 49.7 percent of the cost of T3 and 55.9 percent of
the cost of T1. Although one would prefer a program in which the waste
was small, what matters for assessing the efficacy of the program is a
comparison of the program’s benefits relative to its costs.V. Conclusions
This paper evaluates the effect of the ALI pilot program that randomly
assigned 88 Mexican high schools to three treatment groups and to a
control group to measure the effectiveness of three alternative perfor-
mance incentive schemes on mathematics tests scores: ðT1Þ incentives
for students only, ðT2Þ incentives for teachers only, and ðT3Þ individual
and group incentives for students, teachers, and administrators. Previ-
ous studies used randomized trials to analyze effects of student-only or
teacher-only incentive schemes, but the ALI program is the first exper-
imental study to combine student and teacher incentives.
An analysis of student test scores finds very large treatment impacts for
treatments T1 and T3 that pay incentives to students. Further exami-
nation of the test score answer booklets revealed that the student in-
centive payments also induced a higher rate of cheating in the form of
student copying. We proposed an adjustment procedure to account for
the higher rates of copying estimated to have occurred in these treat-
ment groups versus the control group. Even after making adjustments
for copying, we find substantial program impact estimates on mathe-
matics achievement.This content downloaded from 128.042.187.224 on May 25, 2017 12:58:04 PM
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AllOur general findings, based on the copying adjustment, can be sum-
marized as follows: ðiÞ Providing the ALI incentives to students alone
increased mathematics test scores by 0.2–0.3 of a standard deviation,
depending on the grade and year. ðiiÞ Providing ALI incentives to teachers
alone did not affect test scores. ðiiiÞ Providing ALI incentives to students
and mathematics teachers ðboth for their own performance and for that
of their peers and for other teachers and school administratorsÞ led to
the largest treatment effect estimates, increasing test scores by 0.3–0.6 of
a standard deviation. ðivÞ Analysis of treatment effects conditional on
initial test score performance categories shows that there are positive
impacts across the entire baseline test score distribution. Finally, our
sensitivity analysis explored the robustness of the impact estimates to
allowing for differential test-taking effort between the treatment and
control groups. Assuming, for example, that all of the measured T1
impact in the first year is due to test-taking effort, we still find large
impacts of treatment T3.
The fact that incentive payments in the ALI program are performance
basedmeans that the cost of any treatment increases with its success. The
per-student cost of T3, the most successful treatment, is 50 percent more
than that of T1. However, T3 and T1 differed in many ways, with T1
providing rewards based on individual student performance only and T3
rewarding both individual and group performance for students, teachers,
and administrators. We can isolate the cost of each of the components
of T3, but the experimental design does not identify the relative contri-
bution of each component to T3’s greater success. Similarly, the cost of
T2 was less than 1.5 percent of the cost of T3, but T2 was found to be
ineffective.
A limitation of the ALI experiment, as of all experiments, is that we
can learn the impact only of the treatments that were tried and only in
the population studied. Extrapolations to other populations would have
to account for the fact that the subset of Mexican federal high schools
studied was selective and that there were preexisting programs that
provided school attendance subsidies. To learn about effects of other
treatments, such as variations in the performance incentive schedules,
requires either additional experiments or the development and esti-
mation of behavioral models that can be used to extrapolate to other
hypothetical treatments or to other populations.3737 See Todd and Wolpin ð2006Þ for an example of the use of experiments and modeling
for the purpose of performing counterfactual experiments.
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As discussed in Bloom ð2005Þ, carrying out power calculations before imple-
menting an experiment requires some guesswork, because one needs an idea of
the variance of the outcome and some estimate of the intraclass correlation.
Once the experiment has been implemented, however, these preliminary esti-
mates can be refined using the experimental data. As an easy way of under-
standing the power of an experimental design, Bloom introduces the notion of a
minimum detectable effect size ðMDESÞ for a given level of power ðkÞ, signifi-
cance level ðaÞ, group size ðnÞ, number of groups ð JÞ, intraclass correlation ðrÞ,
and a proportion of subjects allocated to the treatment group ðPÞ. The MDES is
the program impact ðdivided by the standard deviation of the outcome for the
target populationÞ that can be detected with the specified parameters ðpower,
significance levelÞ under a particular experiment. The formula for the MDES is
MDES5
MJ22
J 1=2

r1
12 r
n
1=2 1
P ð12 P Þ
1=2
; ðA1Þ
where MJ22 varies depending on whether a one-tailed or two-tailed t-test is con-
ducted; MJ22 5 t12k 1 ta=2 for a two-tailed test and MJ22 5 t12k 1 ta for a one-tailed
test. In the case of ALI, the average group size ðnÞ is 200 students per school per
grade. The number of groups is 28 for the control group and 20 for the treat-
ment group, for a total ð JÞ of 48 and a proportion ðPÞ equal to 0.4167. For the
calculations below, we require a power of 0.8 and assume an intraclass correla-
tion ðrÞ equal to .12, which is the estimated correlation using the full sample ðall
88 schoolsÞ for the baseline ninth-grade mathematics ENLACE ðfor each gradeÞ.
With these parameters, the MDESs in a one-tailed test are 0.34, 0.26, and 0.22 for
the three critical values a5 :01, .05, and .10. Similarly, at those same critical
values, the MDESs are 0.37, 0.30, and 0.26 for a two-tailed test.
As noted above, the required sample size can be substantially smaller if the
analysis is conditioned on baseline school-level covariates. In the case of ALI,
lagged school-level baseline student test scores are powerful predictors of cur-
rent test scores, and including them in a treatment impact regression substan-
tially reduces the estimated intraclass correlation. Therefore, the MDESs re-
ported above are conservative.Appendix B
A. Calculation of the Student Bonus
For tenth-grade students, s is the semester, s 5 1, 2; cks is the mathematics class
designation k in semester s; ncksfijg is the number of students in class k in semester s
with test scores that place them in the ijth cell of the tenth-grade performance
bonus schedule; bfijg is the bonus payment to a student in the ijth cell of the
tenth-grade performance bonus schedule; and Bmnfijg is the total bonus payment to
a student with a test score in the fijgth cell of the tenth-grade performance
bonus schedule who was in classm in semester 1 ðs5 1Þ and class n in semester 2
ðs 5 2Þ.This content downloaded from 128.042.187.224 on May 25, 2017 12:58:04 PM
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AllBonus formula:
Bmnfijg 5 bfijg 1

o
fijg
1
2
ðncm1fijgbfijg 1 ncn2fijgbfijgÞ

 :01:
For eleventh-grade students, s is the semester, s 5 3, 4; cks is the mathematics
class designation k in semester s; ncksfijg is the number of students in class k in
semester s with test scores that place them in the ijth cell of the eleventh-grade
performance bonus schedule; bfijg is the bonus payment to a student in the ijth
cell of the eleventh-grade performance bonus schedule; and Bmnfijg is the total
bonus payment to a student with a test score in the fijgth cell of the eleventh-
grade performance bonus schedule who was in class m in semester 1 ðs 5 3Þ and
classn in semester 2 ðs 5 4Þ.
Bonus formula:
Bmnfijg 5 bfijg 1

o
fijg
1
2
ðncm3fijgbfijg 1 ncn4fijgbfijgÞ

 :01:
For twelfth-grade students, B is the bonus payment.
Bonus formula:
B 5
5; 000 if test score is Proficient
10; 000 if test score is Advanced:
(
B. Calculation of Mathematics Teacher Bonus
With s as the semester, s5 1, 2 for tenth grade, s5 3, 4 for eleventh grade, and s5 5,
6 for twelfth grade; nsfijgk is the number of teacher k’s students in semester s with
test scores that place them in the ijth cell of the performance bonus schedule; bsfijg
is the bonus payment per student in the ijth cell of the performance bonus
schedule for semester s, where b1fijg 5 b
2
fijg, b
3
fijg 5 b
4
fijg, and b
5
fijg 5 b
6
fijg; fk is teacher k’s
full-time equivalence ðFTEÞ status, which is the number of math classes taught over
an entire year ðboth semestersÞ divided by 10;38 M is the total number of mathe-
matics teachers over the entire year regardless of the number of classes taught;
F 5om5Mm51 fm is the total number of full-time-equivalent mathematics teachers in the
school; B1k is the bonus payment to teacher k for the performance of teacher k’s
students; B2k is the bonus payment to teacher k for the performance of students
schoolwide; Bk is the total bonus payment to teacher k; and F2 fk is the number of
full-time-equivalent teachers subtracting off teacher k’s FTE status.
Bonus formula:
B1k 5
1
2 o
s56
s51
o
fijg
nsfijgkb
s
fijg;
B2k 5

1
F 2 fk o
M
m51;m ≠k
B1m

 fk  :25;
Bk 5 B1k 1 B
2
k :
38 For example, a teacher who taught five classes in the fall term and five classes in the
spring term will have an FTE status of one ð fk 5 1Þ, while a teacher who taught four and
three classes in the two terms will have an FTE status of .7 ð fk5 .7Þ. It is possible to have an
FTE status that is greater than one.
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aligning learning incentives of students and teachers 361C. Calculation of Nonmathematics Teacher, Director, and Associate Director Bonus
With s as the semester, s 5 1, 2 for tenth grade, s 5 3, 4 for eleventh grade, and
s 5 5, 6 for twelfth grade; fk is the nonmathematics teacher or administrator k’s
FTE status; M is the total number of mathematics teachers over the entire year
regardless of the number of classes taught; F 5om5Mm51 fm is the total number of
full-time-equivalent mathematics teachers in the school; B1m is the bonus payment
to mathematics teacher m for the performance of teacher m’s students; Bk is the
total bonus payment to nonmathematics teacher or administrator k ; and F is
the number of full-time-equivalent mathematics teachers.
Bonus formulas: For a director:
Bk 5

1
F o
M
m51
B1m

 fk  :50:
For a nonmathematics teacher and associate administrator:
Bk 5

1
F o
M
m51
B1m

 fk  :25:This content downloaded from 128.042.187.224 on May 25, 2017 12:58:04 PM
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